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An interdisciplinary reappraisal of Lynn White, Jr.’s “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic 
Crisis” reopens several issues, including the suggestion by Peter Harrison that White’s thesis 
was historical and that it is a mistake to regard it as theological. It also facilitates a compari-
son between “Roots” and White’s earlier book Medieval Technology and Social Change. In 
“Roots,” White discarded or de-emphasized numerous qualifications and nuances present in 
his earlier work so as to heighten the effect of certain rhetorical aphorisms and to generalize 
their scope and bearing well beyond what the evidence could bear. The meaning of Genesis 
and other biblical books proves to be just as important in White’s thesis as their historical 
reception. In “Roots,” White presents, alongside other contentions, the claims that Christian 
doctrines have all along been both anthropocentric and despotic, especially in the West, and 
that this is where the real roots of the problems are to be found. These claims, however, 
conflict with most of the relevant evidence. An adequate reappraisal of White’s work needs 
to recognize that there is a cultural determinism parallel to the technological determinisms 
alleged by R. H. Hilton and P. H. Sawyer, to endorse Elspeth Whitney’s “single-cause” 
critique of links between religion and technological change in the Middle Ages, and to 
treat sympathetically Whitney’s claim that White and some of his eco-theological critics 
(despite their disagreements) have in common both their valorizing of individual beliefs and 
values and their neglect of economic and institutional factors. Nevertheless, our ecological 
problems need to be understood through explanations turning on beliefs and values as well 
as on economics and institutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION: SCOPE AND AIMS
 Lynn White, Jr.’s famous and controversial essay from 1967, “The Historical 
Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis”1 has had a widespread influence, permeating not 
only scholarly circles in the disciplines of history, theology, and philosophy, but 
 * School of English, Communication and Philosophy, Cardiff University, Humanities Building, 
Colum Drive, Cardiff CF10 3EU, United Kingdom. Attfield is the editor of The Ethics of the Environ-
ment (Farnham, England and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2008), and author of works including Creation, 
Evolution and Meaning (Aldershot, England and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2006), Environmental 
Ethics: An Overview for the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, England: Polity, and Malden, Mass.: 
Blackwell,  2003), and The Ethics of the Global Environment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999). His book The Ethics of Environmental Concern (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), which is available in 
a second edition (Athens, Ga. and London: University of Georgia Press, 1991), was one of the earliest 
monographs in the field of environmental philosophy.
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also youth organizations and many other branches of semi-popular culture, being 
reprinted in numerous publications including The Boy Scout Handbook and the 
hippie newsletter The Oracle, and being reprised in Time Magazine and in The 
New York Times.2 By now, the influence of “Roots” has become a cultural given, 
unlikely to be modified by journal articles, however broad or scholarly. To cite 
one prominent example, the history of Western attitudes to animals and to nature 
in the chapter entitled “Man’s Dominion: A Short History of Speciesism” of Peter 
Singer’s seminal and in many ways admirable work from 1976 Animal Liberation3 
was almost certainly written under the influence of “Roots” (among other sources), 
and has long been exercising a powerful influence of its own. By now, the genie 
of White’s impact can hardly be put back in its bottle.
 Nevertheless, after forty years, a reassessment is needed. For example, environ-
mentalists and ethicists need to determine whether White’s claims should figure 
in their understanding of the causes of ecological problems, and whether their 
solutions should be influenced in turn by what they conclude about such causes. 
Theologians, many of whom have developed overtly new approaches to ecological 
issues (ecotheologians), albeit ones often held to be rooted in theological traditions, 
need to reflect on the extent to which White was ascribing blame to Christian beliefs, 
not the least so as to be able to attain clarity about the correctives that would be 
necessary if this is what he was doing, and if he was doing so justifiably. Alter-
natively, different correctives could be in place if his remarks were theologically 
misleading. Historians too need to relate the claims made by White in “Roots” to 
his own parallel studies of medieval history in more sustained works, and also to 
reflect on his methodological stance. In short, nothing less than an interdisciplinary 
review is needed.
 No single essay can supply conclusive answers to all the above questions. But 
that is not a conclusive reason against attempting an interdisciplinary study, par-
ticularly where (as in this case) recent research prepares the way, throwing light on 
many of the key issues. Fortuitously, White’s own works on medieval history, or 
so I claim, allow a more nuanced approach to medieval technology than is found 
in “Roots,” and relatedly a rather different interpretation of cultural history; and 
all of this may turn out to have a bearing both on history, on methodology, and 
on addressing ecological problems. First, however, an attempt to retrieve his mes-
sage is needed, since only by doing so can it be judged whether this message was 
historical, theological, or both.
 In section two, I present an overview of “Roots.” Section three is an appraisal 
of certain historical claims made in “Roots,” initially by comparing “Roots” with 
parallel passages in White’s earlier Medieval Technology and Social Change, where 
a much more qualified, if vulnerable, historical narrative is supplied. In section 
four I consider whether the central message of “Roots” was historical as opposed 
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to theological, as has been claimed, or whether White’s claims extend to both of 
these fields. Some earlier research on the reliability of his theological claims is also 
summarized. In section five I turn to issues of methodology, from his determinism 
to his interpretative assumptions, and introduce some of the findings (historical, 
theological and methodological) of Elspeth Whitney, who criticizes both White 
and his critics for ignoring systemic explanations of ecological problems. In the 
afterword (section six) I comment on the relation of systemic explanations and 
explanations like those implicit both in White and in his ecotheological critics that 
stress individual beliefs and values, suggesting that both are needed.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF “ROOTS”
 At the core of White’s “Roots” article, connected theses are presented concern-
ing medieval technology, cultural history, and the relations between (on the one 
hand) religious beliefs and values and (on the other) technology and attitudes to 
it. Commentators divide between those who construe White’s message as relating 
to medieval history rather than to theology, and those who take seriously White’s 
apparent portrayal of Christianity as the cause of our ecological problems and take 
his message to be theological as much as anything else. White’s eminence as a 
historian of medieval technology helps explain the former view, while the appear-
ance, partly in response to White, of a considerable body of writing in the field 
of ecotheology helps explain how the latter view is also credible. My own view, 
defended below, is that significant theses are present both about history and about 
theology, together with significant assumptions about the causal role of individual 
values.
 By this stage the conclusion has become undeniable that an inquiry aiming to 
understand and appraise White’s message (and indirectly his influence too) would 
be bound to fail if it did not seek to be interdisciplinary. It is for this reason that the 
current essay has sections on medieval agriculture and technology, on theological 
themes, and also on historical methodology. But first it is appropriate to present 
readers with some key themes and moments from “Roots” itself.
 The following extract shows how claims about a new kind of plough are used 
to illustrate a supposedly distinctive change of cultural attitude toward nature:
SOCIAL HISTORY, RELIGION, AND TECHNOLOGY
By the latter part of the seventh century after Christ, however, following obscure begin-
nings, certain northern peasants were using an entirely new kind of plough. . . . Thus, 
distribution of land was based no longer on the needs of the family but, rather, on the 
capacity of a power machine to till the earth. Man’s relation to the soil was profoundly 
changed. Formerly man had been part of nature; now he was the exploiter of nature. 
Nowhere else in the world did farmers develop any analogous agricultural implement. 
Is it coincidence that modern technology, with its ruthlessness toward nature, has so 
largely been produced by descendants of these peasants of northern Europe?4
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 White reinforces this interpretation, and amplifies its scope, further down the 
same page:
The victory of Christianity over paganism was the greatest psychic revolution in the 
history of our culture.5
White proceeds to explicate this verdict by attempting to answer the question 
“What did Christianity tell people about their relations with the environment? 
Christianity is not initially characterized here as Western, although some of his 
claims are qualified by the expression “Especially in its Western form, . . .” Nor 
is his subject matter qualified as medieval Christianity, for it is here that he cites 
the second-century church fathers, Tertullian and Irenaeus. Writing, then, of the 
conversion of Europe and the whole Mediterranean region from paganism to 
Christianity, he states that
The spirits in natural objects, which formerly had protected nature from man, evapo-
rated. Man’s effective monopoly on spirit in this world was confirmed, and the old 
inhibitions to the exploitation of nature crumbled.6
 Seeking to summarize the paragraphs that follow, Peter Harrison has produced 
the following paraphrase: 
The Christian doctrine of the creation sets the human being apart from nature, advo-
cates human control of nature, and implies that the natural world was created solely 
for our use.7
What I have said may well apply to the medieval West, where in fact technology made 
spectacular advances. But the Greek East, a highly civilised realm of equal Christian 
devotion, seems to have produced no marked technological innovation after the late 
seventh century, when Greek fire was invented. . . . Eastern theology has been intel-
lectualist. Western theology has been voluntarist. The implications for the conquest 
of nature would emerge more easily in the Western atmosphere.8
This passage well captures what White is saying here, despite Harrison’s later claim 
that White’s message concerns the medieval reception of Christianity rather than 
its central message.
 Nevertheless, White later attempts to limit the scope of his claims, or rather to 
apply them more particularly to the West than to the East of Europe, although not 
exclusively so.
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White develops this theological distinction with further historical claims, sum-
marized as follows by Harrison:
SOCIAL HISTORY, RELIGION, AND TECHNOLOGY
In the Christian Middle Ages, according to White, we already encounter evidence of 
attempts at the technological mastery of nature, and of those incipient exploitative 
tendencies  that come to full flower in scientific and technological revolutions of later 
eras. All of this is attributed to the influence of Judeo-Christian conceptions of cre-
ation. Christianity, White concludes, “bears a huge burden of guilt for environmental 
deterioration.”9
Thus, Christianity is substantially to blame for the nineteenth-century alliance of 
science and technology (offshoots both, in White’s account, of Christianity) and 
for their “ecologic effects.”10
 It is at this stage that White suggests that we either find a new religion, or rethink 
our old one.11 In the first connection, White considers Zen Buddhism and Hinduism, 
but expresses doubt about “their viability among us” (Westerners, presumably). 
His preferred alternative is to adopt the nonanthropocentric values of the “hereti-
cal” St. Francis, whom he proposes as a patron saint for ecologists,12 and to reject 
what he depicts as “the Christian axiom” that “nature has no reason for existence 
save to serve man.”13
 Some immediate remarks are appropriate here. First, White can hardly be inter-
preted as having nothing to say about theology. Second, his advocacy of a non-
anthropocentric metaphysic (and implicitly of a nonanthropocentric value theory) 
will be a welcome one to many environmental ethicists, whether or not the success 
of such advocacy would be sufficient even to begin to cure ecological problems. 
Third, his interpretations of Christianity (and also of Francis as a heretic) are open 
to legitimate questioning. But fourth, the same is also true of his interpretations of 
cultural history, the topic which should next be addressed.
III. THE ROOTS OF “ROOTS” AND ITS HISTORICAL MESSAGE
 White’s book Medieval Technology and Social Change, published in 1962, 
includes a chapter on medieval agriculture, of which a large section relates to the 
introduction of heavy ploughing, its social impacts, and what it symbolizes.14 A 
comparison of this section with relevant paragraphs in “Roots” (which was, as 
noted above, first published in 1967) suggests that this section was his direct source 
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for those paragraphs, particularly in view of the considerable verbal similarities. 
Some of his more striking sentences in “Roots” are in fact direct quotations from 
this section.
 It is worth comparing the two passages. The earlier passage from Medieval 
Technology is full of qualifications. The “Roots” passage turns out to be nuanced in 
places to reflect the need for such qualifications, but the lessons drawn are neither 
nuanced nor, I argue, compatible with the qualifications of Medieval Technology. 
Further, the Medieval Technology passages that were subsequently quoted in 
“Roots” prove to be rhetorical sentences that appear to conflict with the style and 
to some extent the content of their 1962 contexts. 
 One of these is a passage about the “new” plough and its impacts. “No more 
fundamental change in the idea of man’s relation to the soil can be imagined: once 
man had been part of nature; now he became her exploiter.”15 How far does the 
section on heavy ploughing bear out either this summary or the general implica-
tion of “Roots” that it was the conversion of northern Europe to Christianity that 
explains the new “exploitation of nature”?
 The claim in “Roots” that the eight-oxen plough was new is actually under-
mined by White himself, who in Medieval Technology cites the younger Pliny as 
describing such a plough as in use in Italy (in the Po Valley, White suggests) in the 
second century c.e.16 White proceeds to discuss the gradual introduction of heavy 
ploughing in various places in Europe (far from all of them in Northern Europe) 
over the period up to the eleventh century. Marc Bloch, who in 1931 synthesized 
and promulgated the theory that heavy ploughing produced a new field system and 
social system in Northern Europe (and to whose memory Medieval Technology 
is dedicated), did so with wide-ranging reservations and doubts, and these quali-
fications are summarized here by White.17 For example, strip-fields of the kind 
supposedly resulting from the introduction of the heavy plough are to be found 
in places where the old kind of plough remains in use (Syria and Sardinia), while 
open fields of the kind supposed to result from this agricultural revolution are to be 
found in pre-conquest Mexico, where no ploughs were in use at all.18 In any case, 
the open-field system, as also found in Sardinia, served equally “to increase the 
facilities for rearing cattle” as well as “putting maximum arable into grain,”19 and 
was thus likely to be introduced when either of these motives was present, rather 
than specifically requiring the one relating to ploughing.20
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 Further evidence shows that the heavy plough was in use among Slavs (western, 
eastern, and southern ones alike) prior to the Avar invasion of 568 c.e., which 
separated southern Slavs from the others.21 But this evidence seems to suggest that 
heavy ploughing was widespread in the sixth century among ethnic groups who were 
either (just possibly) Christians of the Eastern variety (contrary to White’s thesis 
exempting Eastern Christianity from the “exploitative” tendencies epitomized in 
his view of the new kind of ploughing) or more probably pagans (whose inhibitions 
to “the exploitation of nature” were yet “to crumble,” since this crumbling was to 
take place, according to “Roots,” with the adoption of Christianity).
 As for England, the balance of evidence suggests, according to White, that 
heavy ploughing was introduced into the Danelaw by the Viking invaders of the 
later ninth and early tenth centuries, from whom the English word plough (spelt 
thus in British English) seems to derive (from the Old Norse term plogr).22 If so, 
there can scarcely have been an agricultural revolution across Northern Europe 
in the seventh century. Further, given that some of the ninth and tenth-century 
Vikings were pagan, not even at this late stage in the history of the heavy plough 
can it be regarded as a Christian innovation. The evidence does support changed 
methods of agriculture in the Rhineland in the seventh century, suited to supporting 
a greatly enlarged population there,23 although this interpretation has been chal-
lenged.24 But not even White believed that it spread to the Norse until somewhat 
later, maybe shortly before they brought it in the ninth century to England and to 
Normandy.25
 The overall picture, then, is that while it is true that “certain northern peasants” 
were using heavy ploughs in the seventh century, these ploughs were not new, 
not distinctively Western (but derived from places further south and east), not 
distinctively or characteristically Christian, and only sometimes associated with 
changes in field-systems or in the organization of society. White’s claim about the 
uniqueness of the plough of these northern peasants is cast into doubt by his own 
evidence about its presence many centuries earlier both in Italy (as attested by 
Pliny) and in the northern Balkans or Danube valley (among the Slavs). Further, 
White’s remark in “Roots” about modern technology originating in the descendants 
of these peasants,26 far from reflecting an obvious truism, is itself either untestable 
or implausible, since we scarcely know who these peasants were, and, to the extent 
that we are confident that they were Rhenish Franks, since his remark hardly fits 
the geographical distribution of subsequent technological inventions. For the same 
reasons, while White proceeds to show (not the least in Medieval Technology) that 
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there was considerable technological development in northern and western Europe 
in the later middle ages, we are utterly unable to correlate the attitudes concerned 
(whether “exploitative” or otherwise) with those of the peasants who introduced 
the “new” plough.
 Similar reservations are in place about White’s claim about a changed relation 
of humanity to the soil. If there can be strip-field systems and open fields run on a 
communal basis either with or without heavy ploughs, then the introduction of these 
ploughs can hardly have significantly changed the relation to the soil of humanity, 
or even of the Northern European segment of humanity. The suggestion that there 
was such a dramatic change might begin to make sense if, as used to be supposed, 
the heavy plough was introduced very quickly over a significant area, e.g., with 
the Anglo-Saxon invasion of England; but it is White himself who discounts such 
a theory.27 Harrison credits the interpretation of “Roots” about heavy ploughing: 
“The introduction of the heavy plough into northern Europe made possible the 
large-scale cultivation of land and lifted agricultural production above the level of 
subsistence farming. This technological innovation thus revolutionized  the rela-
tionship between human beings and the land that they inhabited. . . .”28 However, 
this interpretation hardly coheres with the facts insofar as they are disclosed in 
White’s fuller and earlier text from 1962.
 But in any case, how credible is it that users of the scratch plough, unlike us-
ers of the heavy plough, were parts of nature (as White seems to imply, both in 
Medieval Technology and in “Roots”29)? As we have seen, the scratch plough 
was compatible with the same land systems and social systems as Bloch’s theory 
attributes to the heavy plough. Besides, is ploughing of any kind best described 
or understood as “being part of nature”? Are Hesiod and Varro, Columella and 
Vergil best described as parts of nature, with no traces or tendencies toward its 
mastery? More plausibly the transition from hunter-gathering to agriculture was 
a far more significant transition even than that from hoeing to ploughing. If, how-
ever, deployers of the scratch plough can be considered “parts of nature,” perhaps 
through living in some kind of harmony with natural forces and cycles, then why 
are things so very different with  the introduction of the eight-oxen plough with 
its share and mouldboard? The change hardly warrants White’s claim that “now” 
(in the seventh century, apparently) man became nature’s “exploiter.”30
 Yet this is the phrasing used by White in Medieval Technology as well as in 
“Roots,”  immediately after regaling his readers (in Medieval Technology, albeit not 
in “Roots”) with all the qualifications cited above, and with more. As will be seen, 
White seems to have had a hankering after aphorisms, particularly double-barrelled 
ones, such as the one about man, who was formerly part of nature, becoming nature’s 
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exploiter. These aphorisms are somewhat reminiscent of that Hebrew parallelism 
to be found in the Old Testament Psalms and other poetic writings. White could 
have come across this literary form in Christian worship (for, despite his apparent 
criticism of the legacy of Christianity, he was himself a believing Christian31); or 
he could have encountered it in the aphorisms of Francis Bacon’s New Organon. 
He also seems to have judged that this particular trope has much greater effect if 
employed sparingly, unexpectedly and suddenly.32
 However, White used another such double-barrelled aphorism on the next page 
of Medieval Technology and at the end of the next paragraph of “Roots,” after 
describing the new style of illustrations of the calendars of Charlemagne’s reign. 
Instead of passive personifications of the months, the new illustrations relate to 
human activities, and were said by Henri Stern (whom White here quotes) to show 
a “coercive attitude towards natural resources.” (The new activities include plough-
ing, harvesting, wood chopping, and pig slaughtering.) At this point, White inserts 
his further aphorism: “Man and nature are now two things, and man is master,”33 
replicated in “Roots” with the omission of now.34 The omission of now marginally 
assists his case, since he is here writing of the ninth century, rather than of the sev-
enth, as in the previous paragraph. But similar reservations are again in place. Were 
humans really part of nature at any time, since the year was reflectively divided into 
a calendar of months by the Greeks and the Romans, or by their predecessors, the 
Mesopotamians and the Egyptians? On the other hand, can any creature dependent 
on nature’s seasons (and thus the calendar) be altogether nature’s master, or even 
see themselves as such?
 In both the case of ploughing and that of calendar illustrations, White magnifies a 
phenomenon of the early Middle Ages so as to confer on it something approaching 
cosmic significance. Whitney cites a later passage of White which throws light on 
this tendency: “It is better for a historian to be wrong than to be timid.”35 White’s 
sparing employment of sonorous aphorisms, intermingled with an amazing array 
of well-honed scholarship, seems to have persuaded many readers to treat them as 
gospel.
 Harrison’s eventual interpretation of technological innovations such as heavy 
ploughing (which is also applicable to Carolingian calendar illustrations) is far more 
appropriate. “Yet in none of this,” he affirms (in a passage about early medieval 
practices), “do we encounter the explicit articulation of an attitude of indifference 
to, or hostility toward, nature. Indeed, there seems to be no compelling reason to view 
these developments as anything more than particular expressions of the universal 
tendency of all cultures to seek efficient means to provide for basic human needs.”36 
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As he adds, there is, in this analysis, no “religiously motivated ideology of exploita-
tion, explicitly informed by the Christian doctrine of creation.”37
IV. THE MESSAGES OF “ROOTS”: 
HISTORICAL, THEOLOGICAL, OR BOTH?
 In this section, I discuss whether White’s thesis is really about the historical recep-
tion of Christian texts, as Harrison has suggested,38 as opposed to concerning, in part, 
their meaning and their theological interpretation. I suggest that White was propounding 
not only a historical thesis, but also an interpretation of Christianity.
 Harrison has some distinctive insights about what White’s thesis consists in. He 
maintains that what is relevant to White’s thesis is not the meaning of Genesis 1 but 
its reception in different periods, and proceeds to supply interesting and original 
interpretations of the different receptions of Genesis in the middle ages and in the 
seventeenth century.
White’s thesis is not concerned with the meaning of the text as such, with how it was 
understood by the community in which it first appeared, or with what modern biblical 
scholars have made of it, but rather with what the text was taken to mean at certain 
periods of history, how it motivated specific activities, and how it came to sanction a 
particular attitude toward the natural world. . . . White’s thesis does not therefore lie 
within the ambit of biblical criticism or hermeneutics but in the sphere of history.39
However, while the reception of Genesis is certainly relevant (as he proceeds to 
show), the meaning of Genesis and other Old Testament books is far from obviously 
irrelevant, despite Harrison’s claims that attention to the meaning of these texts 
involves “a common but misplaced line of argument,” undertaken by a wide range 
of historians, theologians, and philosophers.40 “. . . it is the reception of the text, 
and not its presumed meaning, which is at issue here,” he concludes.41 Harrison 
finds a passage in Whitney’s paper which appears to say much the same:
White’s claim that the Bible had inspired the development of Western technology and 
control of nature rested not on the biblical text per se or on any “timeless” theological 
explication of it. . . . The crucial question, therefore, was not so much what the writers 
of the Old and New Testaments had meant about technology, or even how their world 
might be construed by modern readers, but how the Bible had been interpreted in the 
Middle Ages and after.42
Yet, Whitney nevertheless goes on to consider seriously (in my view, to her credit) the 
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stances of the various ecotheologians as responses to White which carry both merits 
and demerits, including assumptions which they and White hold in common. 
 I argue here that the meaning of Genesis and related works is just as important 
in White’s thesis as their historical reception, in view of White’s claims about the 
message and perennial impact of Christianity (and implicitly about those of Judaism 
as well). If so, considerable doubt is cast on Harrison’s claim (quoted above) that 
“White’s thesis does not lie within the ambit of biblical criticism or hermeneutics 
but in the sphere of history.”43 Further, while White seeks (in “Roots”) to exempt 
Orthodox Christianity from his interpretations,44 it is far from clear that he can 
consistently do so, for if Christianity is anthropocentric and supports a despotic role 
for humanity (according to which human beings may treat nature as they please: 
see below), these interpretations will be equally applicable to all traditions that 
subscribe to Christian theology, even if some were linked to a less “voluntarist”45 
(activist) cultural attitude than others.
 White, for example, asserts that “Especially in its Western form, Christianity is 
the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.”46 But an anthropocentric 
religion is one that either regards the entire material creation as created for human 
benefit (metaphysical anthropocentrism), or which treats none but human beings 
(plus maybe God) as having moral standing, and none but human interests (plus 
perhaps God’s) as warranting moral consideration (normative or ethical anthro-
pocentrism). White’s text suggests that he intended more particularly the former 
interpretation (although the former is often treated as an obvious basis for adherence 
to the latter as well), for he wrote later in “Roots” that “we shall continue to have 
a worsening ecologic crisis until we reject the Christian axiom that nature has no 
reason for existence save to serve man.”47 But this is a claim about a (supposed) 
fundamental tenet of Christianity in general, and not only of medieval or Western 
Christianity. (Here it is worth remarking that for neither of these interpretations does 
White offer a shred of evidence, despite the accuracy of most of his other claims. 
The evidence that he cites, from Tertullian and Irenaeus,48 discloses a high view 
of humanity as embedded in Christianity [Christ being the “Second Adam”], but 
does not begin to bear out anthropocentric interpretations, whether metaphysical 
or normative.) In any case it is becoming clear already that White was deeply in 
the business of theological interpretation, and that his theological interpretations 
are going to be crucial to his claims about historical impacts. 
 This view is strongly supported by the content of the programmatic single-sentence 
paragraph which opens this phase of his argument: “What did Christianity tell 
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people about their relations with the environment?”49 His use of the past tense here 
does not relate solely to the medieval period, let alone to the reception of Christian 
teaching in that period, for in the next paragraph he writes of what Christianity 
inherited from Judaism through texts such as Genesis,50 and it is in the paragraph 
following that he cites Tertullian and Irenaeus (of the second century c.e.).51 His 
use of the past tense concerns, then, what Christianity was teaching all along and 
from earliest times.
 In case it is suggested that White had in mind something less than metaphysical 
or normative anthropocentrism, it should be remarked that he proceeds, in the same 
paragraph as that in which this term is used of Christianity, to illustrate his claim 
with the supposed implication that Christianity “insisted that it is God’s will that 
man exploit nature for his proper ends.”52 Yet, this further claim, besides implic-
itly ascribing to the Christianity of all periods both metaphysical and normative 
anthropocentrism of a rather Aristotelian kind, goes further by suggesting that it 
teaches that human beings are authorised to treat the natural world as they please, 
as long as the treatment is related to “their proper ends,” an Aristotelian or Stoic 
phrase that White neglects to explain, let alone defensibly relate to Christianity in 
general. Indeed, this further claim amounts to what John Passmore, writing in 1974, 
was to call “the despotic view.”53 White attempts to illustrate this further claim 
by asserting that “By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to 
exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects,”54 but 
once again no evidence is cited. Indeed, as Whitney has remarked, White’s claim 
that Christianity banished animism in the West clashes with evidence of pagan 
survivals in popular religion in the Middle Ages, and with the conception of the 
universe as a living organism that survived into the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.55
 The main point, though, is that in “Roots” White presents not only a thesis about 
the reception of Christian doctrines in the Middle Ages, and about this reception 
comprising the roots or origin of subsequent ecological problems, but also the 
further thesis that those doctrines have all along been both anthropocentric and 
despotic, especially in the West, and that this is where the real roots of the prob-
lems are to be found. (Indeed, these further theological claims are crucial to his 
overall case. To the extent that White is concerned with medieval interpretations 
of Christianity, his theological claims permitted him to imply that the exploitative 
attitudes to nature which he purported to discover arose naturally from the axioms 
Spring 2009 43
 56 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,”p. 86.
 57 Ibid., p. 95.
 58 Robin Attfield, “Christian Attitudes to Nature,” Journal of the History of Ideas 44 (1983): 369–86. 
Together with a companion essay discussing parallel themes of John Passmore and of Peter Singer, 
called “Western Traditions and Environmental Ethics,” this essay can be found in Robin Attfield, 
Environmental Philosophy: Principles and Prospects (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994). 
 59 Robin Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, 2d ed. (Athens, Ga. and London: University 
of Georgia Press, 1991), chaps. 2 and 3.
 60 Robin Attfield, “Western Traditions and Environmental Ethics,” in Robert Elliot and Arran Gare. 
eds., Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of Readings (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 
1983), pp. 201–30; reprinted in Attfield, Environmental Philosophy, pp. 41–68.
 61 Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, pp. 11–17
of the Christian religion, which contrasted strongly in relevant respects with, for 
example, the religions of pre-Christian paganism.) Much of this account is con-
firmed as accurate in Harrison’s summary of “Roots,” despite Harrison’s claims 
a few pages later about White’s main message. The following sentence figures in 
Harrison’s paraphrase: “The Christian doctrine of the creation sets the human being 
apart from nature, advocates human control of nature, and implies that the natural 
world was created solely for our use.”56 (Needless to say, Harrison by no means 
endorses White’s view, and in due course implies considerable scepticism.57)
 These being the claims that White was making, it is entirely reasonable for 
theologians and philosophers (insofar as philosophers discuss metaphysical and 
normative anthropocentrism) to debate White’s claims, and not only historians. 
While theologians must be free to contest White’s interpretations of Christianity 
(Western, Orthodox, or ecumenical), philosophers must also be free to debate his 
methodology in looking for explanations of ecological problems. Thus, the debate 
needs to be conducted through all these disciplines, and not only through the dis-
cipline of history. Once again, it emerges that the debate about “Roots” needs to 
be interdisciplinary—just like White’s own writings.
 Some years ago, I published an essay called “Christian Attitudes to Nature” in 
Journal of the History of Ideas, which contested White’s theological claims, as 
well as some of his historical interpretations, and some related claims of Passmore 
and of William Coleman.58 Some parallel research was also included in my book 
The Ethics of Environmental Concern.59 Since the central conclusions of this re-
search have not, to my awareness, been contested, there is no need to recapitulate 
them in detail here, let alone to add a detailed defence. But it may be appropriate 
to specify here some of the conclusions of “Christian Attitudes to Nature,” of a 
companion piece entitled “Western Traditions and Environmental Ethics,”60 and of 
The Ethics of Environmental Concern, since they have a bearing on several of the 
claims shown above to be made by White. These conclusions include the follow-
ing: the Old Testament is neither metaphysically nor normatively anthropocentric 
(as Passmore had already argued61); passages such as Psalm 104 and Job, chapters 
39 to 41, reflect quite different attitudes, as do Leviticus, Deuteronomy, and Prov-
erbs. Nor is the New Testament anthropocentric either, when enough passages are 
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considered. There again, the “despotic view,” endorsed by Passmore as the stance 
of most Christians and generally of the Stoics,62 does not fit the Bible any more 
than anthropocentrism does; the most appropriate interpretation is what Passmore 
called “the stewardship view”63), which is actually itself ascribed by Passmore’s 
(deservedly) most favored source, C. J. Glacken’s Traces on the Rhodian Shore, to 
the Bible and to most of the church fathers alike.64 Indeed this tradition, regarded 
(in company with the “cooperation with nature” tradition) by Passmore as a minor-
ity tradition,65 was arguably (and like the “cooperative view”) as significant and 
influential as any other attitude to nature from the early centuries of Christianity 
onwards. In any case, Christianity has been much more varied in its attitudes than 
most commentators acknowledge (a point also made, as it happens, by White).66
 If these conclusions are granted (even in part), then White’s theological claims 
have to be regarded as a distortion of Christianity. It would not follow, however, 
that Christianity was not received as anthropocentric, despotic, and exploitative 
in the medieval period; and it would certainly not follow that there were not links 
between theology and technological developments. Issues surrounding these links 
will be considered in the next section. But in view of White’s explicit appeal to 
Genesis,67 it is appropriate to cite here, as Harrison does, “the one extensive study 
that has been carried out on the history of the interpretation of the crucial text, 
Genesis 1:28 (‘be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it; and have 
dominion’),” that of Jeremy Cohen.68
 This text sounds likely, if any text was going to be used in support of exploitative 
practices, to be the one that would be selected. But this is not the interpretation 
that Cohen finds. Instead, he relates that “the primary meaning of Gen. 1:28 dur-
ing the period we have studied [ancient and medieval times, that is] [consists in] 
an assurance of divine commitment and election, and a corresponding challenge 
to overcome the ostensive contradiction between the terrestrial and the heavenly 
inherent in every human being.69 For the Middle Ages, he adds, this text “touched 
only secondarily on conquering the natural order.”70 Instead, this text was given 
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psychological and spiritual interpretations. Thus in a period when attempts to tame 
or domesticate nature were much in evidence (for White is in general right about 
the progress of medieval technology),71 such practices were not standardly justified 
by reference to the most obvious Biblical passage.72 Cohen, indeed, concludes, 
insofar as the medieval period is at issue, that “with regard to Gen 1:28 itself, the 
ecologically oriented thesis of Lynn White and others can now be laid to rest.”73 
So we should entertain doubts about whether Christianity was used as a central 
justification for such practices in that period. Not even its reception in the Middle 
Ages suggests otherwise, any more than the message that it embodied from earliest 
times.
 As Harrison proceeds to show, things were somewhat different in the seventeenth 
century, including the uses to which Christianity was newly put, although in that 
century the texts were not interpreted anthropocentrically, even if they had some-
times been so interpreted previously.74 But that period is not discussed by White, 
and is not relevant here, while I have commented elsewhere on Harrison’s account 
and verdicts about the early modern period,75 and there is no current need to repeat 
those comments. So we can now turn, as promised, to links between theology and 
technology, and to issues of historical causation.
V. METHODOLOGY, CAUSATION, AND WHITNEY’S CRITIQUE
 Ever since soon after the publication of Medieval Technology, historians have 
raised sceptical problems about White’s methodology. In the joint introduction 
to their separate reviews of Medieval Technology, R. H. Hilton and P. H. Sawyer 
wrote:
SOCIAL HISTORY, RELIGION, AND TECHNOLOGY
Technical determinism in historical studies has often been combined with adventurous 
speculations particularly attractive to those who like to have complex developments 
explained by simple causes. The technical determinism of Professor Lynn White Jr., 
however, is peculiar in that . . . he gives a misleadingly adventurist cast to old-fashioned 
platitudes by supporting them with a chain of obscure and dubious deductions from 
scanty evidence about the progress of technology.76
While these strictures were written about Medieval Technology (at a time when 
“Roots” was unwritten), it is worth considering what these writers had in mind 
when using the phrase “technical determinism.” This is most clearly elucidated by 
Sawyer, in his reply to White’s view that the introduction of the stirrup explains 
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a change in methods of warfare (toward the superiority of cavalry) in the early 
medieval period. To this theory, Sawyer replies:
The most serious weakness in this argument is that the introduction of the stirrup is not 
in itself an adequate explanation for any changes that may have occurred. The stirrup 
made new methods possible, not inevitable.77
Yet, as Sawyer shows through a quotation from Medieval Technology,78 White 
had used, with regard to such changes, the term inevitably, even though in other 
passages,79 he had accepted that societies do not respond automatically to tech-
nological change. Thus, the criticisms of Hilton and Sawyer seem to be on target 
in this particular regard. But should it be held that White proceeded to allege too 
deterministic a relation not only between technology and social change, but also 
between theology and technology? Hilton and Sawyer evince no interest in this 
aspect of Medieval Technology, but the issue has recently been investigated in the 
context of “Roots” by Whitney.
 Whitney, besides supplying numerous valuable historical qualifications and cor-
rectives to White’s account of medieval culture (too many for most to be cited here), 
raises a number of important methodological issues. One of these concerns the aura 
of inevitability cast by White upon the West’s rise to technological dominance, 
represented by White as “our nature and destiny.”80 Here Whitney accuses White 
of an essentialist view of medieval culture,81 but whether or not this accusation 
holds good, she seems justified in claiming that in “Roots” Western culture “takes 
on a life of its own, as if culture existed independently of social, economic, politi-
cal and other factors and remains essentially unchanged through time.”82 Whitney 
here emphasizes the need to introduce institutional factors into explanations; in 
the absence of the introduction of such factors, culture is inappropriately endowed 
with tendencies (as just mentioned) to inevitable development, which are liable to 
be falsified (as she proceeds to show) when more detailed studies are conducted 
and taken into account. Insofar as the inevitability of White’s account ascribes a 
causal role to religious values, there may be some justification in finding here a 
form of cultural determinism in White, parallel to the technical determinism alleged 
by Hilton and Sawyer.
 A related methodological problem, raised by Whitney on the next page, concerns 
the move from what she regards as the undisputable association between religious 
values and technology in the West to White’s implicit claim of a causal relationship.83 
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Later she adds that, while White supplies ample evidence (for the Middle Ages) of 
this association, he sheds little light on “the more difficult problem of causality.”84 
She adds that by 1978 he had resiled from ascribing causal influence to religious 
values, writing that the reasons for the medieval development of technology were 
“by no means clear.”85 In any case, in the Middle Ages religious terminology was 
bound to be used in the justification of technology; as Jacques Le Goff puts it, 
“. . . nothing could become an object of conscious reflection in the Middle Ages 
except by way of religion.”86 Besides, as Le Goff’s research has also shown, the 
more favorable attitude to labour in the late Middle Ages remarked by White was 
probably due to social change rather than to inherent attitudes of Christianity.87 But 
this all casts serious doubt on the “single-cause theory” of “Roots,”88 particularly 
where a “more nuanced interpretation” is in place, as recent medieval research 
warrants, such as the interpretation that “religious values provided some encour-
agement, but, equally importantly, a justification for activity that most likely was 
taking place for other reasons.”89 This claims chimes well with Harrison’s remark, 
cited above, about people simply doing their best in the circumstances to satisfy 
human needs.
 Whitney (as has been mentioned above) also appraises the responses to White of 
ecotheologians (including myself), partly on theological grounds. Thus, they “had 
a well-documented argument against certain aspects of White’s thesis, and could 
argue persuasively that the Christian tradition provided a readily accessible and 
convincing statement in favor of a sensitive and responsible attitude to the environ-
ment.” They also had liabilities, such as that stewardship interpretations preclude 
deep ecology (hardly, I suggest, a problem for those not wishing to be associated 
with that movement) and the constraints of Christian orthodoxy (pollution having 
to be interpreted as “sin”), which discouraged “independent human agency” (but 
if so, I suggest, Christian orthodoxy should be either modified or disowned).90
 Whitney’s willingness to discuss these responses betokens her recognition that 
White’s thesis was in part an exercise in theological interpretation. Thus, when she 
wrote that “The crucial question, therefore, was not so much what the writers of 
the Old and New Testaments had meant about technology, or even how their world 
might be construed by modern readers, but how the Bible had been interpreted in 
the Middle Ages and after,”91 her point was that this was the basis on which White 
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had argued (and on which he should therefore be replied to, at least in part), and 
not that the meaning and message of the Bible were irrelevant.
 It is appropriate to introduce here Whitney’s implicit criticism of White’s proposed 
solution (adoption of the values of the heretical St. Francis). Citing the research of 
Susan Power Bratton, she relates that detailed medieval studies show that Francis, 
“far from standing alone, is only one figure among a fully developed tradition of 
Christian appreciation of nature as God’s Creation . . . human use of nature and 
animals was almost always conceived of as being governed by human spiritual 
and moral obligations.”92 Further, Bratton’s and others’ research suggests that the 
large differences of attitude between Greek and Latin values were less absolute 
than White claims.93 Thus, not only does White misrepresent the problem as con-
cerning distinctively Western values, but his solution of adopting the supposedly 
heretical values of St. Francis turns out to consist, it could fairly be commented, in 
advocacy of little more than the adoption of a different tradition of still recogniz-
ably Christian values.
 However, Whitney’s main criticism of the ecotheologians concerns “how much 
they had in common with [White].” “White and his ecotheological critics all ac-
cepted religion as the common denominator or human action, and all therefore 
found the solution to the environmental crisis in personal and religious values.”94 
Such assumptions incline those holding them to ignore economic and institutional 
factors. Indeed, while the ecotheologians rejected White’s particular causal thesis, 
they “showed little interest in” where else the explanation really was to be found.95 
Since the current writer is included among the ecotheologians, it might be reason-
able here to cite the opening chapter of The Ethics of Environmental Concern as an 
exception to this generalization, a chapter which considers to what extent capital-
ism, among other possible explanations, underlies the problems.96 But Whitney’s 
point must be acknowledged to be largely on target, and prepares the way for her 
eventual methodological claims.
 Whitney concludes that White’s thesis is attractive, beguiling, and dangerous, 
however illusory. Althrough ascribing the problems to our deep-seated values 
and the unfolding of our ideological destiny, it supplies a solution that does not 
require significant changes either of behavior or of structure. At the same time, it 
leaves large corporations and international agencies untouched. Its ascription of 
the problems to individual values thus diverts us from the kinds of action that are 
needed. To quote Whitney’s final passage:
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 White’s single-visioned reading of the past, however, encourages us similarly to 
oversimplify our understanding of the present by emphasizing one value, the legitimacy 
of human domination of nature in the name of spiritual progress, to the exclusion not 
only of other, non-religious values, but also of any consideration of how economic and 
political systems help create or reinforce values and provide the means for implementing 
those values. If White is incorrect in his analysis of the causes of the environmental 
crisis, and we continue to follow his prescription for a solution, we may be at the mercy 
of forces we are not even considering.97
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 Besides concluding in this passage that White’s thesis should be rejected, 
Whitney also persuasively explains here its continuing ideological role. White’s 
explanation is of the wrong type, and this is due to methodological assumptions 
which his theological and philosophical critics have done too little to expose. 
 This being so, it is important to adduce historical, theological, and philosophi-
cal critiques of White’s claims (as attempted above), without losing sight of the 
large and systemic nature of the problems (both past and present), and the need to 
understand the present as well as the past accordingly. At the same time, we need 
not to lose sight of the importance of multidimensional explanations to explain 
both how ecological problems have arisen and how they can be overcome.
VI. AFTERWORD
 Solutions, then, need to be economic and political, and to be global as well as 
national and local. Yet, while Whitney’s critique is to be applauded, can White’s 
approach be entirely written off? His historical claims have been shown to be open 
to serious criticism, as have his theological interpretations. But what of his assump-
tion that values and attitudes make a difference and can be historically significant? 
As a “single-visioned reading of the past,” this assumption too is open to question. 
But, construed as a claim about attitudes and values having a contributory role both 
in causing problems and in their capacity to contribute to solutions, and to play a 
part in people’s motivation to implement them, his assumption is less obviously 
misguided, and may even contribute to a defensible approach.
 This more nuanced approach may seem a far cry from White’s dalliance with 
determinism, but coheres well with elements of his overall stance, such as his view 
that adopting the beliefs and values of St. Francis could make a difference. It is 
more clearly consistent with the message of the ecotheologians, whether or not 
they specifically recognized the role of systemic factors. Indeed, their characteristic 
claim that an ethics and a metaphysics of stewardship (whether religious or secular) 
are needed and can contribute to resolute action as well as to desirable attitudes 
emerges, despite criticisms,98 as not only a salutary corrective to White, but a 
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positive contribution to resolving current problems. Beliefs and values prove also 
to be central to Harrison’s account of early modern culture, and potentially to his 
view of the spirit in which solutions to current problems could be approached.
 Beliefs, values, and attitudes, then, should be integrated with systemic factors both 
in explaining the past, understanding contemporary problems, and in generating 
proposals for solutions. For example, a replacement of anthropocentric values with 
more biocentric ones arguably has an important role to play in moulding social and 
environmental policies. White’s thesis in “Roots” was of little direct help in any of 
these regards, but because of the debate that he was proud of generating, and the 
awareness both of historical, ethical and ecological problems that it helped to arouse, 
his historical contribution should not be regarded as negligible or insignificant, let 
alone as a dangerous distraction.
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